Título: Didáctica de geografía e historia en educación primaria Autor: Laura Arias Ferrer y Alejandro Egea Vivancos Edición: Editorial Síntesis Lugar de publicación: Madrid Año: 2022 Idioma: Español ISBN: 978-84-1357-231-4 Páginas: 198.

In this paper, I take issue with an idea that has emerged from recent relativist proposals, and, in particular, from Lasersohn, according to which the correct semantics for taste predicates must use contents that are functions of a judge parameter rather than implicit arguments lexically associated with such predicates. I argue that the relativist account and the contextualist implicit argument-account are, from the viewpoint of semantics, not much more than notational variants of one another. In other words, given any sentence (...) containing a taste predicate, and given any assignment of values to the relevant parameters, the two accounts predict the same truth value and are, in that sense, equivalent. I also look at possible reasons for preferring one account over the other. The phenomenon of "faultless disagreement" is often believed to be one such reason. I argue, against Kölbel and Lasersohn, that disagreement is never faultless: either the two parties genuinely disagree, hence if the one is right then the other is wrong, or the two parties are both right, but their apparent disagreement boils down to a misunderstanding. What is more, even if there were faultless disagreement, I argue that relativism would fail to account for it. The upshot of my paper, then, is to show that there is not much disagreement between a contextualist account that models the judge parameter as an implicit argument to the taste predicate, and a relativist account that models it as a parameter of the circumstances of evaluation. The choice between the two accounts, at least when talking about taste, is thus, to a large extent, a matter of taste. (shrink)

Andrés el Capellán: dialéctica y juego en el amor. Resumen de Tesis de doctorado en Filosofía de Nicolás José Martínez Sáez.

In this paper, I argue that there are good motivations for a relativist account of the domain-sensitivity of quantifier phrases. I will frame the problem as a puzzle involving what looks like a logically valid inference, yet one whose premises are true while the conclusion is false. After discussing some existing accounts, literalist and contextualist, I will present and argue for an account that may be said to be relativist in the following sense: (i) a domain of quantification is required (...) for determining truth value, but is idle in determining semantic content, and (ii) the same sentence, as used on one and the same occasion, may receive different truth values relative to different domains. (shrink)

The paper explores a structural account of propositional justification in terms of the notion of being in a position to know and negation. Combined with a non-normal logic for being in a position to know, the account allows for the derivation of plausible principles of justification. The account is neutral on whether justification is grounded in internally individuated mental states, and likewise on whether it is grounded in facts that are already accessible by introspection or reflection alone. To this extent, (...) it is compatible both with internalism and with externalism about justification. Even so, the account allows for the proof of principles that are commonly conceived to depend on an internalist conception of justification. The account likewise coheres both with epistemic contextualism and with its rejection, and is compatible both with the knowledge-first approach and with its rejection. Despite its neutrality on these issues, the account makes propositional justification luminous and so is controversial. However, it proves quite resilient in the light of recent anti-luminosity arguments. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: When we describe an event as sad or happy, we attribute to it a certainemotional value. Attributions of emotional value depend essentially on an agent ; and yet, people readily disagree over such values. My aim in this paper is to explain what happens in the case of “emotional disagreement”, and, more generally, to provide some insight into the semantics of value-attributions.

In this paper, I take issue with the proposal put forward by Mark Richard in When Truth Gives Out (2008) concerning disputes over issues such as who is rich, what is cool, and other issues of similar ilk. Richard holds that the parties in the dispute can truly disagree on whether a given person is rich, but can be both right, if we assume that they have different standards of wealth. Disputes over what is cool are, according to Richard, trickier, (...) since they can give rise to cases of faultless disagreement in which the two parties disagree, and neither party is wrong, but neither party is right either! My fi rst goal in this paper will be to showthat the distinction between the two types of disagreement, as drawn by Richard, is not well motivated. I will also argue that if he were right about the stronger case (disagreement in which both parties are right), his own account would fail to capture it. He can capture either the idea that they truly disagree, or the idea that they are both right; but he cannot both have his cake and eat it, too.My second goal will be to bring to the foreground some constructive aspects of Richard’s proposal, and in particular the idea that such disagreements involve concepts whose application is not fully determined and whose usage is open to accommodation and negotiation (to use Lewis’s terms, as used by Richard). If we accept that on some occasions, whether a concept applies to a given instance or doesn’t is not yet settled, then arguably there are cases in which neither party is wrong—at least at the time of the dispute. I argue that their disagreement can be genuine only to the extent that it will eventually be settled whether the concept isto apply to a given instance or not, hence the way in which the concept gets shaped up and extended through its future uses makes it possible to determine, retrospectively, which of the two parties got it right. If this is correct, then the putative cases of faultless disagreement really turn upon the openness of the future: what makes them “faultless” is, simply, that there isn’t any matter of fact yet whether the one or the other party is right. (shrink)

The nature of moral judgments, and, more specifically, the question of how they relate, on the one hand, to objective reality and, on the other, to subjective experience, are issues that have been central to metaethics from its very beginnings. While these complex and challenging issues have been debated by analytic philosophers for over a century, it is only relatively recently that more interdisciplinary and empirically-oriented approaches to such issues have begun to see light. The present chapter aims to make (...) a contribution of that kind. We will present the results of an empirical – specifically, corpus linguistic – study that offers evidence that moral predicates exhibit hallmarks of subjectivity at the linguistic level, but also, that they differ significantly from paradigmatically subjective predicates. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to argue against a growing tendency to assimilate moral disagreements to disagreements about matters of personal taste. The argumentative strategy adopted in the paper appeals to a battery of linguistic criteria that reveal interesting and important differences between predicates of personal taste and moral predicates. The paper further argues that these semantically tractable differences have an impact on the nature of the corresponding disagreements.

Justification as Ignorance offers an original account of epistemic justification as both non-factive and luminous, vindicating core internalist intuitions without construing justification as an internal condition knowable by reflection alone. Sven Rosenkranz conceives of justification, in its doxastic and propositional varieties, as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing and of being in a position to know. His account contrasts with recent alternative views that characterize justification in terms of the metaphysical possibility of knowing. Instead, he develops a suitable (...) non-normal multi-modal epistemic logic for knowledge and being in a position to know that respects the finding that these notions create hyperintensional contexts. He also defends his conception of justification against well-known anti-luminosity arguments, shows that the account allows for fruitful applications and principled solutions to the lottery and preface paradoxes, and provides a metaphysics of justification and its varying degrees of strength that is compatible with core assumptions of the knowledge-first approach and disjunctivist conceptions of mental states. (shrink)

Aesthetic judgments are often expressed by means of predicates that, unlike ‘beautiful’ or ‘ugly’, are not primarily aesthetic, or even evaluative, such as ‘intense’ and ‘harrowing’. This paper aims to explain how such adjectives can convey a value-judgment, and one, moreover, whose positive or negative valence depends on the context.

Within certain philosophical debates, most notably those concerning the limits of our knowledge, agnosticism seems a plausible, and potentially the right, stance to take. Yet, in order to qualify as a proper stance, and not just the refusal to adopt any, agnosticism must be shown to be in opposition to both endorsement and denial and to be answerable to future evidence. This paper explicates and defends the thesis that agnosticism may indeed define such a third stance that is weaker than (...) scepticism and hence offers a genuine alternative to realism and anti-realism about our cognitive limits. (shrink)

The paper discusses the position of young people in Serbia today, as can be inferred from the evidence collected in the study "Politics and everyday life - three years later". Starting from the typology she developed in her 2002 analysis of young people?s interviews, the author traces the changes that have intervened over the past three years in the attitudes of these same respondents concerning politics, personal engagement, views of the future and of their own selves. The fact that the (...) expectations, awakened by the events of 5 October 2000, have been betrayed, has brought strong disappointment, and it is the context in which young people in Serbia once again are losing faith that they will ever find their place in their own society. Against the background of a basic tension in relation to politics - between excessive interest and disgust - there basic strategies of young people in 2005 are formed. "Withdrawal", as the most common strategy, indicates a return of the young to their narrow personal, private, imaginary world, after a short exit into reality and active participation in creating the conditions of their own social existence. The increasingly frequent strategy of "aggression and imposition of one?s own worldview" points to the rising radicalization of the young generation. Finally, it is only the "planning strategy", espoused by just a handful of respondents, that retains traces of faith in future improvement of social conditions. Tekst razmatra poziciju mlade generacije u Srbiji danas, onako kako se ona moze iscitati iz empirijskog materijala prikupljenog studijom "Politika i svakodnevni zivot - tri godine posle". Oslanjajuci se na tipologiju koju je izgradila prilikom analize intervjua s mladim ljudima pre tri godine, autorka prati promene u stavovima prema politici, sopstvenom angazmanu, pogledu u buducnost i dozivljaju samih sebe do kojih je kod istih ispitanika doslo tokom protekle tri godine. Razocaranje zbog izneverenih ocekivanja, probudjenih dogadjajima od 5. oktobra 2000, stvara kontekst u kojem mlade ljude u Srbiji ponovo napusta vera da ce pronaci za sebe mesto u vlastitom drustvu. Na pozadini osnovne napetosti u odnosenju prema politici - izmedju preterane zainteresovanosti i gadjenja - formiraju se tri dominantne strategije mladih 2005. Najzastupljenija "strategija povlacenja" iskazuje povratak mladih u uski licni, privatni, imaginarni svet, posle kratkog izleta u realnost i aktivno sudelovanje u oblikovanju uslova sopstvenog drustvenog zivota. Strategija "napada i nametanja svog pogleda na svet", koja je u porastu, ukazuje na radikalizaciju mlade generacije. Konacno, "strategija planiranja", koju zastupa mali broj ispitanika, jedina zadrzava tragove vere u poboljsanje stanja u drustvu. (shrink)

The current debate about peer disagreement has so far mainly focused on the question of whether peer disagreements provide genuine counterevidence to which we should respond by revising our credences. By contrast, comparatively little attention has been devoted to the question by which process, if any, such revision should be brought about. The standard assumption is that we update our credences by conditionalizing on the evidence that peer disagreements provide. In this paper, we argue that non-dogmatist views have good reasons (...) to reject conditionalization. Instead, peer disagreements should be understood to call for a revision of our prior conditional probabilities: rather than merely adding to our original evidence, they pose a challenge to the thought that we have properly assessed the probative force of our original evidence. (shrink)

Many of our sources of knowledge only afford us knowledge that is inexact. When trying to see how tall something is, or to hear how far away something is, or to remember how long something lasted, we may come to know some facts about the approximate size, distance or duration of the thing in question but we don’t come to know exactly what its size, distance or duration is. In some such situations we also have some pointed knowledge of how (...) inexact our knowledge is. That is, we can knowledgeably pinpoint some exact claims that we do not know. We show that standard models of inexact knowledge leave little or no room for such pointed knowledge. We devise alternative models that are not afflicted by this shortcoming. (shrink)

Among semanticists and philosophers of language, there has been a recent outburst of interest in predicates such as delicious, called predicates of personal taste (PPTs, e.g. Lasersohn 2005). Somewhat surprisingly, the question of whether or how we can distinguish aesthetic predicates from PPTs has hardly been addressed at all in this recent work. It is precisely this question that we address. We investigate linguistic criteria that we argue can be used to delineate the class of specifically aesthetic adjectives. We show (...) that there are, in fact, good motivations for keeping PPTs and aesthetic predicates apart: the semantic structure of the former, but not the latter, entails an experiencer. There are many adjectives whose semantic structure arguably also entails an experiencer, yet which are readily used in expressing aesthetic judgments. Adjectives such as provocative or moving are a case in point, since as adjectives they arguably maintain the experiencer argument from the verb they are derived from. Nevertheless, when we describe, say, a sculpture as provocative, or a theater performance as moving, we clearly make aesthetic judgments. The difficult question, then, is to articulate the relationship between an aesthetic predicate (of which beautiful and ugly are paradigms) and other predicates that just happen to be used in making an aesthetic judgment. Tightly related to this point is the more general question of the relationship between an evaluative predicate and a predicate that occurs in an evaluative judgment. One of our aims is to make some progress in addressing these questions. (shrink)

Tekst analizira nacin na koji nastavno osoblje na Beogradskom univerzitetu percipira bolonjski proces, nacelno i unutar lokalnog srpskog socijalnog i univerzitetskog konteksta; razlicite upravne instance unutar univerzitetskog obrazovnog sistema, mesto nastavnika unutar obrisa novog visokoskolskog obrazovnog sistema u procesu bolonjske transformacije. Empirijsku osnovu predstavlja istrazivanje o uslovima rada nastavnog osoblja koje je Centar za obrazovne politike iz Beograda izveo na pet fakulteta Beogradskog univerziteta tokom 2008 godine.

Osnovna intencija istrazivanja je da retrospektivno sagleda promene u konstruktu pozeljnog modela zenskih rodnih uloga u periodu 'razvijenog samoupravnog socijalizma' (1970-tih), periodu strukturne krize socijalizma (1980-tih) i postsocijalistickom periodu srpskog/jugoslovenskog drustva, onako kako je on konstruisan u zenskom casopisu 'Bazar'. Kroz osnovne postavke teorijskog okvira istrazivanja pokusacemo da koncipiramo i priblizimo se pretpostavljenom novom komunikacionom modelu koji ce biti u stanju da u istrazivanje inkorporira sve promene nastale u samom procesu komunikacije izmedju emitera i recipijenta i time doprinesemo boljem razumevanju (...) sadrzaja poruke. (shrink)

In a series of recent papers, Crispin Wright has developed and defended an epistemic account of borderline cases which he calls ‘Liberalism’. If Verdict Exclusion is the claim that no polar verdict on borderline cases is knowledgeable, then Liberalism implies the view that Verdict Exclusion is itself nothing we are in a position to know. It is a matter of ongoing discussion what more Liberalism implies. In any case, Wright argues that Liberalism affords the means to account for the intuition (...) that polar verdicts on borderline cases are equally permissible. Here I argue that Liberalism fails to deliver and that an account of borderline cases based on Verdict Exclusion fares much better when it comes to showing that our ordinary practice of reaching verdicts on borderline cases is fully legitimate: all it needs is a reassessment of the nature of the claims such verdicts express. (shrink)

Functionalism about mental phenomena must account for their multiple realizability. According to standard doctrine, this can be achieved by allowing our folk theory's realization formula to be multiply satisfied by distinct physical properties. If at all, uniqueness can then be restored by suitable relativization to populations or worlds. Recent arguments suggest that this is a dead end. Here the attempt is made to devise a novel type of functionalism that accounts for multiple realizability but rejects the standard doctrine and thus (...) proves immune to those arguments. The distinctive feature of this novel type of functionalism is its use of plural quantification in ramsification, which allows it to retain uniqueness of satisfaction despite multiple realizability while respecting naturalness requirements on physical properties. (shrink)

La ‘declaración’ es uno de los momentos constitutivos de la adquisición de una propiedad (AA 6 258). Este momento debe verse satisfecho si es que dicha adquisición ha de volverse real, sin importar las condiciones empíricas bajo las que tal objeto sea adquirido, ni tampoco el objeto del que se trate (AA 6 251-254, 273). No obstante, teniendo en consideración que la presentación de los attendenda —entre los que la declaración se halla— es posterior a la exposición de los objetos (...) que le son apropiables a nuestro arbitrio (cf. AA 6 247-248), podría pensarse que dichos momentos sufren de algún condicionamiento para su posibilidad en referencia al tipo de objeto que vaya a ser adquirido, o bien, que son estos los que resultan condicionados por ellos. Más aún, en la medida en que toda ‘declaración’ demanda una ejecución, su pretendido estatuto trascendental queda puesto en tensión. No obstante, se mostrará que dicha tensión se resuelve atendiendo a (1) que la procedencia de toda ‘declaración’ es la comunidad originaria, y (2) que la ‘declaración’, fundada en la comunidad originaria, es un acto de habla que no modifica la naturaleza de dicha comunidad. (shrink)

La Psicología moderna ha generado un gran esfuerzo y enormes recursos de investigación en torno a la personalidad creativo/innovadora. Marcos epistemológicos y metodológicos positivistas experimentales han marcado el sentido predominante de la investigación. Tantos recursos y dedicación investigadora no han obtenido hasta la fecha resultados concluyentes y mucho menos satisfactorios. La fusión entre creatividad-innovación y productividad desde los discursos hegemónicos psicológico-manageriales marcan el sentido de la investigación predominante. Los diferentes significados que connotan a los términos “Sociedad de la Información” y (...) “Sociedad del Conocimiento” conllevan cada uno por su lado diferentes significados e implicaciones en relación con la acción innovadora de los consumidores y usuarios. (shrink)

This study analyses the performance and market timing of US socially responsible (SR) mutual funds in relation to business cycle regime shifts and different grouping criteria: Ethical strategy focus, SR attributes scores and Morningstar category. Different methodologies are applied and results highlight the importance of considering specific benchmarks related to the investment style in evaluating the SR fund performance. Our results show that, in aggregate, the abnormal performance of SR funds is negative and significant in expansion periods, but no significant (...) differences are found in recession periods. When specific benchmarks are considered, performance improves in recession periods, particularly for environmental funds, those with high SR attributes scores, and funds from the nine Morningstar style box categories. Market timing of SR funds takes positive values and is partially significant. Previous evidence of negative timing after a recent financial crisis vanishes when specific benchmarks are considered. For comparative purposes the performance of conventional US mutual funds is also analysed. There are no significant differences between the performance of SR and conventional mutual funds when a fair comparison is made within the same style categories. When all the SR funds are considered, they underperform conventional funds in expansion sub‐periods, but in recession sub‐periods they perform better, although the differences observed are not significant. (shrink)

It has been long known (Perry in Philos Rev 86: 474–497, 1977 ; Noûs 13: 3–21, 1979 , Lewis in Philos Rev 88: 513–543 1981 ) that de se attitudes, such as beliefs and desires that one has about oneself , call for a special treatment in theories of attitudinal content. The aim of this paper is to raise similar concerns for theories of asserted content. The received view, inherited from Kaplan ( 1989 ), has it that if Alma says (...) “I am hungry,” the asserted content, or what is said , is the proposition that Alma is hungry (at a given time). I argue that the received view has difficulties handling de se assertion, i.e., contents that one expresses using the first person pronoun, to assert something about oneself. I start from the observation that when two speakers say “I am hungry,” one may truly report them as having said the same thing. It has often been held that the possibility of such reports comes from the fact that the two speakers are, after all, uttering the same words, and are in this sense “saying the same thing”. I argue that this approach fails, and that it is neither necessary nor sufficient to use the same words, or words endowed with the same meaning, in order to be truly reported as same-saying. I also argue that reports of same-saying in the case of de se assertion differ significantly from such reports in the case of two speakers merely implicating the same thing. (shrink)

Ockhamism implies that future contingents may be true, their historical contingency notwithstanding. It is thus opposed to both the Peircean view according to which all future contingents are false, and Supervaluationist Indeterminism according to which all future contingents are neither true nor false. The paper seeks to defend Ockhamism against two charges: the charge that it cannot meet the requirement that truths be grounded in reality, and the charge that it proves incompatible with objective indeterminism about the future. In each (...) case, the defence draws on the idea that certain truths are truths only courtesy of others and of what makes the latter true. After introduction of the Ockhamist view, its competitors and implications, a suitable definition of grounded truth is being devised that both is faithful to the spirit of the grounding-requirement and allows the Ockhamist to heed that requirement quite comfortably. Then two senses in which the future might be open are being introduced, indeterminacy as failure of predetermination by past and present facts, and indeterminacy as failure of entailment by past and present truths. It is argued that while openness in the former sense, but not in the latter sense, coheres with the Ockhamist view, it is only openness in the former sense that matters for objective indeterminism. (shrink)

Our paper discusses Recanati’s application of the mental files apparatus to reports of beliefs and other attitudes. While mental files appear early on in Recanati’s work on belief-reports, his latest book introduces the concept of indexed files (a.k.a. vicarious files) and puts it to work to explain how we can report other people’s attitudes and to account for opacity phenomena. Our goal is twofold: we show that the approach in Recanati’s Mental Files (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) departs significantly from (...) his earlier proposals as well as from the very spirit of truth-conditional pragmatics; and we argue that the indexed files approach, qua an attempt to provide a semantics for belief-reports, is untenable. -/- . (shrink)

The knowledge account of assertion construes assertion as subject to constitutive norms. In its standard version, it combines a wide scope obligation not to assert p without knowing p, with narrow scope principles specifying conditions under which it is permissible to assert p, where the notions of obligation and permission are duals and behave uniformly for variable p. It is argued that, given natural assumptions about the logic of ‘ought’, the account proves incoherent. The argument generalizes to accounts that substitute (...) other factive notions for knowledge. A recent non‐standard version of the knowledge account employs proposition‐relative norms and circumvents the problem. However, it still leads to intolerable combinations of verdicts. Again, the problem arises because knowledge is factive, and it generalizes to other factive notions. It is shown that non‐factive accounts face none of the diagnosed difficulties and can do much of the explanatory work that the knowledge account is alleged to do. (shrink)

Although relativism may be said to be one of the oldest doctrines in philosophy, dating back to the teachings of Protagoras in the 5th century B.C., when it comes to contemporary philosophy, there is no consensus on what makes a view qualify as "relativist". The problem is particularly accute in metaethics, since most of the views that up to a decade ago were described as “relativist” would be more accurately described as "contextualist" or even “expressivist” in light of the distinctions (...) currenty drawn in philosophy of language and semantics. In this chapter, we distinguish two construals of relativism, developed in sections 2 and 3 respectively: the “metaphysical” construal, based on the idea that there is no single, absolute, universal morality, and the “semantic” construal, based on the idea that the truth value of moral claims is relative to a set of moral standards, or moral practices, or some other suitable parameter. Section 1 introduces the core relativist ideas in an informal way, and warns against possible misinterpretations. (shrink)

It has long been known (cf. Frege 1918, Castañeda 1968, Anscombe 1975 , Perry 1977, 1979, Lewis 1981) that de se attitudes, that is beliefs, desires, hopes etc. that one has about oneself as oneself,1 are interestingly different fromthe attitudes that one holds in a third-personal mode about some individual, who might or might not turn out to be them. Frege suggested that Dr. Lauben’s belief that he has been wounded is a belief that only Dr. Lauben himself can entertain. (...) Another person’s belief that Dr. Lauben has been wounded would be a different belief, one that would motivate action in a completely different way. This led Frege to the following puzzle.When Dr. Lauben says “I have been wounded”, he cannot be plausibly taken to express his own first-personal belief that he has been wounded, since nobody else can come to have that same belief. So what is, then, the content that he does express, in order to communicate to others that he has been wounded? Different solutions to the puzzle have been proposed, and my chapter may be seen as yet another attempt at addressing this question. I shall show that not only de se attitudes but also de se speech is interestingly different from third-personal attitudes/speech. (shrink)

Compartimos, con Michel de Certeau, la idea de que las narraciones marchan por delante de nuestras prácticas para abrirles camino. Con ello se hace referencia al papel decisivo que juegan los imaginarios sociales en el proceso de construcción de la realidad. En cada persona, a la hora de analizar el mundo que le rodea, influyen elementos como su experiencia, el estado de ánimo, la personalidad, ideología o educación, entre otros. En el campo de la psicología, el test de Rorschach es (...) un ejemplo de lo que apuntamos. Distintas personas, ante las mismas láminas, ven cosas diferentes. (shrink)

A finales del año pasado se publicaba el Informe sobre juventud en España que periódicamente elabora el INJUVE (Instituto de la Juventud de España). Unas investigaciones sobre la cuestión que, junto a las elaboradas por la Fundación Santa María, son unas de las máximas referencias a la hora de observar las evoluciones que se producen entre los jóvenes españoles.